How Syrian crisis is related to larger powerplay in West Asia

The American-Russian rivalries found another theatre to manifest, opening another front for Russia before the advent of Trump 2.0

Syrian rebels take pictures in the outskirts of of Hama, Syria, Tuesday, December 3. AP

The rebel forces in Syria, last week, suddenly opened up another front to the ongoing conflict in West Asia. What began as an Israel-Hamas confrontation in Gaza after the tragic October 7 killing of Israelis by Hamas, the conflict no longer remained confined to Gaza. It spiralled into Iran-backed Hezbollah’s stronghold, southern Lebanon. To follow the trail, recently, the Islamist militants in northwest Syria attacked President Bashar al-Assad’s forces and exercised seizure of territories in a dramatic twist of events. It added increasing fragility to the region. West Asia finds itself in a boil again. The American-Russian rivalries found another theatre to manifest. The inconclusive Russian-Ukrainian war is extended to the Syrian outburst. The situation looks seriously messy.

Abu Mohammed al-Golani, leader of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in Syria, captured the Syrian city of Aleppo in just three days. This has given HTS militants the necessary impetus to march further and intensify the offensive on Assad’s forces. This armed outfit and its aggression have put Assad’s forces on the defensive. The rebels have cut off the highway from Damascus to Aleppo to create a sufficient connectivity bottleneck for Assad’s forces. Against this aggression, Assad’s ally Russia has swung into action, and airstrikes have intensified. The HTS is trying to find its way through camouflage, but it has captured Hama. This, Assad’s regime may find troubling.

A two-front war has opened for Russia now. The war fatigue is evident because of the unending war with Ukraine. The Syrian conflict will stress Russia. Therefore, HTS’s sudden roll-out indicates the plan to divide Moscow’s focus. Distractions may disturb Russia. Iran has expressed its will to send its militia to fight for Assad. The US has also swung into action through its airstrike as a response to the alleged attacks on its military base named Euphrates in eastern Syria, citing the reasons of self-defence. This will soon complicate the Syrian situation. It is no longer a local conflagration. It has now involved several international and regional forces. Israel and Turkey are also the regional forces that have interests in the region and share borders with Syria.

The Russian support in 2016 through airstrikes and combing rebel areas could secure the Assad regime in Syria. Since then, Assad had consolidated himself in Syria and continued his unchanging and inalterable government without any opposition. It is important to observe how much Russian help can defeat the HTS and its unpredictable forces.

However, the story of resistance goes back to the pro-democratic demonstration called the Arab Spring in 2011. Assad crushed the waves of this resistance. The unrest it led to pushed Syria to a chronic civil war. Armed factions, the Islamic State and rebel factions, convoluted the Syrian condition irreparably. The Russian and Iranian interventions secured the authoritarian Assad regime. This led to economic crisis, migration, and increasing authoritarianism. The US economic sanction following the failure of the Arab Spring in Syria was highly stressful. The rebel groups were completely shovelled away to the Idlib region in the northwest of Syria. By 2020, the conflict reached a stalemate with the brokering of a ceasefire under Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Since 2020, there has not been much conflagration. The recent outburst signifies Assad’s weakness occasioned by the restrained Russian economic support and rudderless Hezbollah under Israeli attack and sanction-stressed Iranian ineffectiveness. Assad’s strength depends on its allies. Weakened Iran and fatigued Russia debilitated Assad’s grit. This created sufficient opportunity for HTS, its affiliates, and collaborators to corner Assad and end the authoritarian regime.

However, it goes without saying that the HTS will not bring democracy to Syria. It will indeed shift Syria from one authoritarianism to another. But this change will restrict Russian interest. The Biden administration, the US deep state, and the military-industrial complex continue to intensify their target on Russia until Donald Trump formally assumes power on January 20, 2025.

Imposing a two-front war on Russia may force Vladimir Putin to react impulsively or miscalculate the situation. Any miscalculation will enable the US to justify its action on Russia. If this happens, Trump will open his second political chapter with conflict-stressed West Asia. The problem with these radical outfits is that once Pandora’s box of violence is opened, it is difficult to control. This will help the military-industrial complex to thrive in a conflict economy.

The Syrian civil war will inflict enough distraction on Iran. This distraction will help Israel to get a breathing space and reorganise and consolidate itself firmly in the region to check Iranian misadventures. Iranian weakness may increase domestic reactions. The repressed groups may re-emerge to bring much-awaited regime change in Iran. The Syrian civil war will weaken the Iran-sponsored axis of resistance. Weak Iran is always good for Saudi Arabia and the UAE to focus on the economic strength of West Asia.

Coming to Turkey, it exercises its weight in northern Syria. The rapprochement initiated by Ankara with Assad in 2022 was responded to with a precondition by the latter. The precondition was to withdraw Turkish forces from Syria. Nothing significant happened thereafter. Now that HTS has been unleashed, it may help Turkey to push the 3.2 million Syrian refugees to their homeland. The refugee crisis has exacerbated the Turkish economy. Erdoğan may use this opportunity to get rid of them. In hindsight, Turkey used the Syrian crisis in 2016 to target Kurdish forces in northern Syria. Kurdish fighters, notably the YPG (People’s Protection Units), were conceived by Turkey as an extension of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party), and Ankara targeted to bring to an end the insurgency along the border and weaken Kurdish nationalism. Turkey may use this conflict to underline its benefits. However, if the situation worsens, the refugee crisis may intensify. It may boomerang Ankara’s interests.

However, knowing Assad and its ally Russia and the lethality of counterattack during the Arab Spring, it is pretty early to say anything definitive. Assad’s usual tactics are to retreat, reorganise, deceive the enemy, and attack vigorously. Assad’s alleged use of chemical weapons in the war was reported in the previous Syrian Civil War. Therefore, it is difficult to assess the enormity of the war now. Trump’s response once he assumes power is yet to be seen. It is quite early to give an opinion. The conflict may lead anywhere.

Jajati K Pattnaik is an Associate Professor at the Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Chandan K Panda is an Assistant Professor at Rajiv Gandhi University (A Central University), Itanagar. The views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.